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I. INTRODUCTION
There is an unexpectedly high level of coordination in policymaking
and institution-building among the states in the arena of climate policy.
An important initial question regarding the high level of state activity in
climate change policy is why individual states choose to become active
in regulating greenhouse gas emissions at all. To the extent that a state
must bear the presumed costs of making and carrying out such policies
without enjoying the presumed potential benefit—namely, an appreciable
decrease in the risks of climate change, states appear to be acting
irrationally. However, other benefits that states may obtain, such as the
opportunity to make a symbolic political statement and become a leader
in developing emissions markets, help explain this apparent puzzle.1
This Article, however, addresses a different question: why have states
chosen to coordinate and collaborate with other states in their development
of climate change law? Or, more specifically, why have many states
joined with other states to become part of a regional greenhouse gas
emission reduction program? The extent of collaboration runs contrary
to the common theories of competition in state environmental policy—
namely, that states are likely to engage in a “race to the bottom” or a
“race to the top.” An analysis of the reasons for state collaboration in
climate change thus holds potential to move towards a more complete
understanding of how and why states interact in the environmental
policy arena. Moreover, teasing out the reasons that states have often
chosen to collaborate sheds light on the state perspectives and interests
that are likely to come into play as federal climate policy is negotiated.
In many cases, the reasons that states join regional initiatives are also
likely to be the same reasons that they would have for favoring a
potential federal regime.
In its first part, this Article examines theories of state competition that
are common in discussions concerning state interaction in environmental
policy. The second part of the Article describes the three primary regional
climate change regulation initiatives that have emerged: the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Western Climate Initiative, and Midwestern
Greenhouse Gas Accord. The final portion of this Article analyzes states’
motivations to collaborate in climate law.

1. See generally Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State
and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2008); J.R. DeShazo &
Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1519 (2007).
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE STATES: COMPETITIVE
THEORIES AND COLLABORATIVE REALITIES
Theories of state competition in environmental policy abound.
According to the “race to the bottom” theory, states will compete to
lower their standards so as to attract economic development to their
state. According to the “race to the top” theory, states compete to raise
their environmental policy for a variety of political and economic
reasons. However, in contrast to assumptions of state competition, extensive
state collaboration has occurred in climate policy. Most importantly,
three large-scale regional agreements have been formed—the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western Climate Initiative, and the
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord—through which states
are cooperating in the development and implementation of regulatory
frameworks for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
A. Theories of State Competition
Discussions of how states relate to one another with regard to their
environmental policies are dominated by competitive dynamics. It has
often been observed that when federal standards are not set, states may
compete for industry and associated economic development through
environmental standards. 2 More specifically, they will seek to set
environmental standards such that they gain a competitive advantage as
a seller of location rights for industrial facilities that are mobile. The
prevailing model is one of strategic competition that may lead states to
establish either more- or less-stringent standards.3 In the particular
context of climate policy, competition has been argued to be the driver
that explains the differences among states in their levels of policy
development.4 This section describes two directions in which a competitive
race may head: to the bottom or to the top.
2. Cf. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-setting: Is There a
“Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1996-1997); Richard L.
Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response To
Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997-1998) (discussing his previous challenge of the race
to the bottom theory); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67 (1996).
3. Engel, supra note 2, at 345.
4. Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change
Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2006).
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1. Race to the Bottom
A common justification for federal regulation has been the theory that,
in its absence, states would compete to lower their environmental
standards in order to provide economic advantages.5
States with lower environmental standards would, theoretically, be
more attractive to businesses concerned with the costs of complying with
environmental regulations. As a result, a process of competition would
create downward pressure on environmental standards. Given the mobility
of industry, localities “will adopt lower standards of environmental
quality than they would prefer if there were some binding mechanism
that enabled them to enact higher standards, thus eliminating the
threatened loss of industry or development.”6
Climate change is the type of environmental problem for which we
might expect a race to the bottom in the absence of federal regulation.7
The costs to state residents may be high: state regulatory action to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions could impose significant costs on existing and
potential businesses in the state. In contrast, benefits may be nonexistent
or small. The emissions reductions achieved by a single state cannot
solve the problem of climate change, and to the extent it might slow
climate change, this benefit accrues to all, not just to the state.8 In sum,
most of the negative environmental impacts of non- or under-regulation
would be felt outside the state, and most of the positive environmental
impacts of regulating would be shared with the rest of the world. Thus,
one would expect that sub-national governments, acting alone, would
consistently under-regulate.9
Critics have challenged the theoretical and empirical support for a race
to the bottom in environmental policy. One influential argument has
been that allowing states to compete in setting standards does not lead to
5. See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, Implications of the
New “Old” Federalism in Climate-Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global
Marketplace When States Take the Lead, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J.
61, 89-90 (2007); Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental
Federalism, 14 NYU ENV’TL L.J. 130, 151 (2005); CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L.
MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL
RELATIONSHIP 22 (stating that the Supreme Court approved of Congress’s reliance on the
race to the bottom rationale in Hodel. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 454
U.S. 264 (1981)).
6. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (19761977).
7. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 1, at 1518-19. But see id. at 1537 (arguing
that the race to the bottom dynamic is inapplicable to climate change because all the states
are technically at the bottom).
8. Id. at 1518.
9. Cf. Rabe et al., supra note 4, at 7.
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a race to the bottom but, rather, to social optimality; net social welfare
will be enhanced as states choose the optimal balance of environmental
protection and economic development for their jurisdictions.10 In other
words, allowing states to choose the standard that most closely reflects
their state-specific cost-benefit calculation leads to a more efficient
allocation of industrial activity among states.11
Those who have defended the theoretical underpinnings of a race to
the bottom have rejoined that there are failures in regulatory competition
that prevent an efficient outcome.12 They argue, for example, that states
do compete for industry by lowering their standards, but the lower
standards do not end up playing a major role in where industries decide
to locate.13 As a result, states may forgo the benefits of higher standards
without capturing the economic benefits that would make this outcome
socially optimal.14 In addition, it has been argued that because the
environmental benefits of regulation are often delayed, state politicians
may suffer from “systematic miscalculations” in trading them off against
economic goals.15
The empirical record supporting the theory that states will race to the
bottom is mixed.16 Critics claim that little empirical evidence supports a
race to the bottom and point to instances in which states choose to
exceed federal standards, which provides evidence to the contrary.17
Defenders, in turn, proffer evidence that state environmental regulators
perceive a race to the bottom and point to the proliferation of state audit
10. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 5; Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 NYU L. Rev. 1210 (1992).
11. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, A New Environmental Federalism, 13 F. FOR
APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y, no. 4: 55-61 (1998).
12. Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 597-98 (2008).
13. Engel, supra note 2, at 337; see Daniel Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996).
14. Cf. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 5.
15. Esty, supra note 13, at 573-74. See Swire, supra note 2, at 101-02 (explaining
that the benefits of environmental regulation tend to produce a weaker interest group
response than the benefits of favoring industry because, inter alia, the former often occur
over a much longer time).
16. Cf. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 12.
17. Adler, supra note 5, at 153-54; Adler, supra note 11, at x (nn.23-26) (pointing
to existence of state regulations in New Jersey and most other states that exceed federal
standards); but see Revesz, supra note 10, at 1228-29 (pointing out the proliferation of
more stringent state standards is not necessarily inconsistent with the race to the bottom).
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privilege and immunity as well as state laws that prevent state
environmental agencies from enacting standards more stringent than
federal minimums.18
2. Race to the Top
Alternatively, there is the possibility that states may engage in a “race
to the top” in environmental regulation.19 In a race to the top, states raise
their environmental standards to achieve some political or economic
advantage vis-à-vis other states. Critics of the race to the bottom theory
often accept that strategic competition may play a role in environmental
policy decision-making at the state level but they suggest that the
direction of the race is unclear.20 As stated by Jonathan Adler, “While it
is plausible that interjurisdictional competition could produce suboptimal
results due to game theoretic interactions, there is no a priori reason to
assume that the result would be state standards that are suboptimally lax,
rather than suboptimally stringent.”21 As such, a race to the top could
occur rather than a race to the bottom, resulting in over-regulation rather
than under-regulation.
In climate policy, there seem to be indications of a race to the top.
States have, for example, progressively increased the amount of
electricity that must be generated by renewable sources under state
“renewable portfolio standards.”22 A competitive dynamic also seems
apparent in the setting of greenhouse gas reduction targets. In 1998,
Vermont became the first state to set a statewide reduction target.23 Six
other Northeastern states had followed suit by 2004.24 By mid-2009,
twenty-one states had done so, including states such as New Mexico and

18. Engel, supra note 2, at 337-351.
19. See generally BARRY G. RABE, RACE TO THE TOP: THE EXPANDING ROLE OF
U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (Pew Center for Global Climate Change
2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf.
20. See Revesz, supra note 2, at 551 (suggesting agreement that game-theoretic
interactions among the states may exist such that interstate competition might not lead to
maximization of social welfare); Engel, supra note 2, at 345 (acknowledging
that a determination that there is strategic competition does not establish whether it
causes states to establish more or less stringent standards).
21. Adler, supra note 5, at 152.
22. RABE, supra note 19, at 7.
23. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CLIMATE CHANGE: ACTION BY STATES TO ADDRESS
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (Congressional Research Service Dec. 4, 2008) 17-18,
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/116579.pdf. See especially Table 1.
24. Id. (showing target adoption by New Hampshire in 2001; New York and Rhode
Island in 2002; Maine in 2003; and Connecticut and Massachusetts in 2004).
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Utah, which engage in substantial coal production.25 The statewide
targets were made mandatory in three of the twenty states: California,
Hawaii, and New Jersey.26 As another example, California adopted
vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards, and sixteen states announced
their intention to follow California.27 In the climate arena, states often
seem to attempt to match or exceed the policy developments in other
states.
The high level of state activity in climate policy suggests that the costbenefit calculation that race-to-the-bottom theorists assumed states
would participate in was too narrow. The economic costs of regulation
may be offset by benefits outside the strictly environmental benefits that
can be captured by the state. Such benefits to state leaders of developing
climate change policies may include satisfying the electorate,28 enhancing
their national political reputation,29 and positioning state emitters to be
eligible for early-action credits in a future federal emissions trading
regime.30
Moreover, there are economic benefits to climate-change regulation
that states may appreciate.31 Improvements in appliance efficiency and
building would generate positive economic returns over their lifecycles,
as would the promotion of vehicle fuel-economy packages that incorporate
25. Id. In addition to the twenty states listed in Table 1, Maryland set targets in April
2009. See Maryland’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Act of 2009 S.B. 278 (Md. 2009),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/billfile/Sb0278.htm (last visited June 2, 2009).
26. RAMSEUR, supra note 23, at 16.
27. A.B. 1493 (Cal. 2002) (California legislation requiring greenhouse gas
emission standards for mobile sources). The states that have followed California are AZ,
CO, CT, FL, MA, MD, ME, NJ, NM, NY, OR, PA, RI, UT, VT, and WA. Press Release,
Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Issues Statement after U.S. EPA
Rejects California’s Tailpipe Emissions Waiver Request (Dec. 19, 2007), http://gov.ca.
gov/press-release/8353/.
28. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 1, at 1519.
29. Jonathan Baert Weiner, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental
Regulation, 87 GEO L.J. 749, 763 (1999) (citing race to the top among politicians vying
for national office); Engel & Orbach, supra note 1, at 134 (discussing political
entrepreneurship).
30. Engel & Orbach, supra note 1, at 134 (discussing future markets for emissions
rights).
31. Cf. JOHN CRYTS ET AL., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW
MUCH AT WHAT COST? xii (McKinsey & Co. Dec. 2007) (estimating that almost 40% of
abatement could be achieved at “negative” marginal costs); Kirsten Engel, State and
Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local Governments to
Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and
Environmental Law? 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1024 (2006); Engel & Orbach, supra note 1, at
132 and 135.
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aerodynamics, reductions in rolling resistance, and other fuel-saving
design elements.32 Indeed, the states that have responded to climate
change have generally done so in ways that they deem likely to
simultaneously promote economic development.33 Regulation requiring
renewable energy generation is often promoted based on its potential to
stimulate new markets and create local jobs.34
To a greater degree than in the case of the race to the bottom, the
empirical evidence supporting a race to the top in environmental
regulation is lacking.35 The apparent race to the top in climate law, and
the political and economic opportunities that help explain it, seem
unlikely to be present in many areas of regulation with less political
salience.36 In these areas, the narrower cost-benefit calculation that
compares economic and environmental benefits is more likely to
adequately characterize the decision-making calculus faced by state
leaders.
B. Collaborative Initiatives
Despite the emphasis on state competition in the environmental
regulation literature, state collaboration has predominated in climate
policy over the past decade. Of the fifty states, twenty-five participate in
one of the three regional climate initiatives. In some cases, these regional
agreements defy geographic zones. The eastern Canadian province
Ontario, for example, has signed on as a member of the Western Climate
Initiative. This section describes each of the collaborative initiatives
with attention to the governance structures that have been established
and the activities that have been undertaken.

32. CRYTS ET AL., supra note 31, at xiii-xv.
33. Barry Rabe, Second Generation Climate Policies in the American States:
Proliferation, Diffusion, and Regionalization, ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUD. No. 6, Aug.
2006 at 3.
34. Id.
35. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 12, at 606 (stating that “there is little evidence
that there is a systematic prisoner’s dilemma in which states are forced to overregulate”).
36. Cf. Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption when there is an
“Emerging Consensus” of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
649, 656 (citing several examples of a race to the top, only one of which–controlling
mercury pollution–is unrelated to climate change). Also, it is worth noting that mercury
pollution gained a high degree of political salience during the 2000s because of the
promulgation of the controversial Clean Air Mercury Rule. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY,
MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS: STATES ARE SETTING STRICTER
LIMITS (Congressional Research Service July 11, 2006)).

88

MCALLISTER (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 1: 81, 2009]

2/15/2016 12:12 PM

Regional Climate Regulation
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW

1. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was established in
2005 with a Memorandum of Understanding signed by seven Eastern
states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, and Vermont.37 RGGI’s cap-and-trade program began operating
in 2009, with the participation of the original signatories and three
additional states: Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.38 The
program caps the emission of carbon dioxide from power plants within
these states at 2009 levels through 2014, and then the cap declines by
2.5% per year through 2018.39
The Memorandum of Understanding was the product of discussions
among the states that dated back to 2003.40 Signatories committed to
developing a “CO2 Budget Trading program” and set forth the overall
regional and state-specific caps (referred to as “budgets”).41 It also
contained other detailed information about the design of the program,
including provisions regarding a safety valve, offsets, early reduction
credits, and banking.42 With respect to the administration of RGGI,
signatories agreed to draft a Model Rule, create a regional organization
to run the program, and monitor its progress.43

37. ERIK B. BLUEMEL, Regional Regulatory Initiatives Addressing GHG Leakage
in the USA, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING: LESSONS FOR
THEORY AND PRACTICE 227 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters, eds., 2008); Memorandum of
Understanding from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Dec. 20, 2005),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf. The states issued an Amendment to the MOU
in August 2006 to make minor modifications related to the compliance period and safety
valve triggers. Amendment to Memorandum of Understanding from Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_8_8_06.pdf.
38. BLUEMEL, supra note 37. Observer jurisdictions, which do not commit to group
GHG reduction goals but participate in proceedings should they opt to join later, include
Pennsylvania and Canadian provinces Quebec, New Brunswick, and Ontario. See Program
Contacts by State, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/Program
_Contacts_By_State.
39. BLUEMEL, supra note 37, at 228-229 (further noting that the program is limited
to electricity-generating units over 25MW that use more than 50% fossil fuel for
combustion, thus encompassing about 750 power plants).
40. Christopher D. Ball, Regional Climate Program Moves Ahead as Pre-emption
Threat Looms, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.
mgkflaw.com/articles2008/legal-20081016.pdf.
41. Memorandum of Understanding from Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, supra note 37, at 2.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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In 2006, RGGI released the final Model Rule, which had to be
adopted by each participating state through legislation or regulation.44
The Model Rule set forth the basic administrative functioning of the
program, including allowance distribution, monitoring and reporting,
and offset provisions. The states then adopted their own versions of the
Model Rule, legally enabling their participation in the program.45
2. Western Climate Initiative
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) was formed with a Memorandum
of Understanding signed in February 2007 by the governors of Arizona,
California, New Mexico, and Oregon.46 Under the pact, the signatories
agreed to set a regional emissions-reduction goal, develop the design for
a regional cap-and-trade program to achieve the goal, and participate in
an emissions registry.47 By 2009, participant states also included Utah
and Montana along with Canadian provinces British Columbia, Manitoba,
Ontario, and Quebec.48
Encompassing a larger array of greenhouse gases and types of emitters
than RGGI, the proposed WCI cap-and-trade program is much more
ambitious. Pollutants covered by the program include carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride.49 When implemented, the program would cover nearly
44. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE (Proposed Official Draft
2006), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_8_15_06.pdf. A corrected Model
Rule was released in January 2007 that reflected non-substantive technical adjustments.
See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE (Proposed Official Draft 2006),
available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf; see Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, PEW CENTER FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.
pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rggi/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).
45. Christopher Ball, Regional Climate Program Moves Ahead as Pre-emption
Threat Looms, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.
mgkflaw.com/articles2008/legal-20081016.pdf (explaining that each state had to pass or
otherwise adopt state rules and regulations that implemented the RGGI Model Rule). In
December 2008, the RGGI states issued a revised Model Rule to reflect consistencies
among state rules. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE (Proposed Official
Draft 2008), available at http://www.rggi.org/model_rule_key_documents_link (follow
“Model Rule (Revised December 31, 2008)” hyperlink).
46. Western Regional Climate Action Initiative (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.azclimate
change.gov/download/wrcai_signed.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Observer states include Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, Wyoming,
the Canadian province Saskatchewan, and Mexican states Baja California, Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Sonora and Tamaulipas. See Western Climate Initiative Update,
WESTERNCLIMATEINITIATIVE.ORG (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/events/
2007-08-30_wci/2007-08_WCU_UPDATE.pdf.
49. D ESIGN R ECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCI R EGIONAL C AP - AND -TRADE
PROGRAM 1 (Western Climate Initiative Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.western
climateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O104F21252.pdf.
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90% of the region’s emissions, including those from electricity, industry,
transportation and commercial facilities.50 The program is slated to
begin in 2012 with the goal of reducing emissions to 15% below 2005
levels by 2020.51
The program is being designed through the work of subcommittees in
the areas of reporting, electricity, scope, allocations, and offsets.52 For
ultimate implementation of the WCI, each state must pass legislation
that authorizes its participation.53
3. The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord (MGGA) was signed in
November 2007. Founding members include the states of Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of
Manitoba.54 The signatories agreed to work jointly to establish greenhouse
gas reduction targets, develop a multi-sector cap-and-trade program,
participate in an emissions registry, and develop other mechanisms and
policies such as a low-carbon fuel standard.55 The Accord established
the Greenhouse Gas Advisory Group consisting of representatives of
public, corporate, and non-profit sector institutions and charged it with
making recommendations to state leaders for Accord implementation.
The Advisory Group then created sub-groups to work on the various
aspects of model rule development—namely, scope, target-setting, data
and reporting, allowances, offsets, and modeling.56

50. Id. at 15-17.
51. Id. at 12, 1.
52. Id. at 54.
53. Cf. Gold et al., Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Legislative Developments in
the United States and in the Western Climate Initiative, PERKINSCOIE.COM (May 21, 2009),
http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx?publication=2135&op=updates
(specifically discussing the barriers to such legislation in several WCI states).
54. MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS ACCORD 4 (Midwestern Governors Association
Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/Publications/Greenhouse
%20gas%20accord_Layout%201.pdf. Observers included Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota.
Id. Ontario joined as an observer in May 2008. See News, New Observer to Accord
Announced, M IDWESTERN GREENHOUSE G AS R EDUCTION ACCORD , May 27, 2008,
http://www.midwesternaccord.org/news.html.
55. MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS ACCORD, supra note 54, at 3.
56. MGA GHG Accord Advisory Group: Meeting One Summary, Mar. 14, 2008,
http://www.midwesternaccord.org/Meeting%20material%20pages/GHG-meeting-1/GHG%
20Accord%20First%20Meeting%20Summary.ppt.
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In November 2008, the Advisory Group released a draft of its
preliminary recommendations that proposed emissions targets and design
elements of the cap-and-trade program.57 Under these recommendations,
the Accord would work towards reducing 2020 emissions by 15 to 25%
below 2005 emissions as well as 2050 emissions by 60 to 80% below
2005 levels. The design recommendations dealt with the program scope,
allowance distribution, offset policies, and mandatory reporting
requirements. However, given that the Accord set an effective deadline
of July 2008 for establishment of the targets and November 2008 for the
“complete development of proposed cap-and-trade agreement and a
model rule,” it is clear that implementation has encountered delays.58
At the same time that the Midwestern Accord was signed, eight members
of the Midwestern Governors Association signed the Energy Security
and Climate Stewardship Platform.59 The Platform set a regional goal to
“maximize the energy resources and economic advantages and opportunities
of Midwestern states while reducing emissions of atmospheric carbon
dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases.”60 To achieve this goal, the
Platform focuses on four main policy areas, with measureable goals and
objectives for each: energy efficiency, biobased products and transportation,
renewable electricity, and advanced coal and carbon capture and
storage.
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR STATE COLLABORATION IN CLIMATE LAW
Generally, states do not collaborate on a regional basis in setting
environmental standards. Most often, state collaborations have occurred
where there is an ecosystem or resource that spans the borders of a group
of states, and those states cooperatively manage that resource.61 The
Chesapeake Bay Program and interstate compacts such as the Ohio
River Valley Water Sanitation Compact are examples.62 Given that

57. M IDWESTERN G REENHOUSE G AS R EDUCTION A CCORD : P RELIMINARY
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY GROUP (Draft, Nov. 1, 2008), available at http://www.
midwesternaccord.org/News%20Page/Accord%20Draft%20Recs%2011%201%2008.doc.
58. MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS ACCORD, supra note 54.
59. ENERGY SECURITY AND CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP PLATFORM FOR THE MIDWEST 6
(Midwestern Governors Association 2007), available at http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/
Publications/MGA_Platform2WebVersion.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Rabe, supra note 33, at 6; Kirsten Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in
the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 57 (2005).
62. Chesapeake Bay Program Office, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.
epa.gov/region3/chesapeake (last visited Aug. 8, 2009); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden
Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 965 (1997). See generally Noah
D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006).
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climate change is a global problem, the regional efforts to regulate greenhouse
gases cannot be similarly explained as a match to the problem’s
geographic scope.
The general weakness of state collaboration in environmental policy
can be understood in economic terms—transaction costs to coordinate at
regional levels are high, and the benefits of doing so have seemed low.63
So part of the inquiry is, “What is different about climate change?” Why
are transaction costs surmountable in climate change policy? This
section identifies and discusses three reasons for the high degree of state
collaboration: to facilitate policy diffusion, to achieve efficiencies in
cap-and-trade, and to engage in a regional race to national influence.
A. Policy Diffusion
Regional collaborations serve as forums for sharing information and
diffusing climate change policy among states.64 This process of policy
diffusion has two drivers that have worked together to produce regional
collaborations. States that lag in developing climate policy may seek to
learn from other states when they join a regional initiative as a member
or an observer. States that are more advanced, in turn, are interested in
diffusing their climate policy developments so that they are not acting
alone in a way that could disadvantage state businesses or the state
economy.
A common justification for federalizing environmental law involves
the economies of scale that the federal government can achieve in
developing and deploying environmental information. Having each state
independently develop pollution regulation, for example, would lead to
duplicative regulatory work, and states would be tempted to free-ride on
other states that make major investments.65 In the absence of federal
involvement in climate policy during the early 2000s, states sought to
obtain similar economies of scale, and the benefits thereof, by
collaborating. In this way, the regional initiatives worked to replace

63. Cf. Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and QuasiConstitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from
the Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 713, 747 (1976- 1977).
64. Rabe, supra note 33, at 5.
65. ROBERT L GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
86 (5th ed., Aspen Publishers 2007); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 12, at 595.
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some of the functions that are usually assumed by the federal
government.66
Importantly, the information to be gained by a state through a regional
collaboration is not just information for information’s sake. Business
opportunities abound in climate policy, and studies have suggested that
many greenhouse gas reductions are achievable at a negative cost.67
States may, thus, view regional collaborations as a source of information
that will enable them to enact policies to promote energy efficiency and
renewable energy—activities viewed as capable of creating jobs and
other economic benefits.68
In addition, states that set greenhouse gas reduction targets may view
joining a regional collaboration as a means toward substantiating and
meeting these commitments. Of the twenty-one states that set state-wide
greenhouse gas-reductions targets, all but four participate in one of the
regional initiatives.69 In the RGGI and WCI, almost all of the member
states set greenhouse gas-reduction targets before they joined the
regional initiative.70 Interestingly, the MGGA is different in this regard:
only two of the six MGGA states have set emissions-reductions targets.71
The information that may be exchanged is region-specific, which may
increase its value. States in a given region may share certain characteristics
that make them suitable for certain renewable energy technologies or
certain energy efficiency approaches. Moreover, while information
sharing in the regional initiatives has been focused on either reducing
emissions or mitigation, states in a given region are likely to also share
certain vulnerabilities, such as rising sea level or changing precipitation
patterns. To the extent that a regional initiative creates a forum to also
discuss or take action on climate change adaptation, states may also
perceive a benefit in this regard.

66. Engel, supra note 31, at 1027.
67. CRYTS ET AL., supra note 31; Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., &
John C. Dernbach, Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in
the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 219, 234 (citing studies of the Center for Climate Strategies).
68. RABE, supra note 19 at 7 (citing “jobs multiplier” of renewable energy sources
as opposed to conventional sources); Engel, supra note 61, at 71 (stating that a regional
focus allows states to reap economic benefits); Rabe, supra note 33, at 3 (discussing
economic development opportunities).
69. RAMSEUR, supra note 23. The four states are CO, FL, HI, and VA.
70. Of the seven WCI states, only Montana has not set statewide greenhouse gas
reduction targets. Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Washington set targets before
joining WCI; Utah set targets in June 2008. See id. at Table 1. Of the ten RGGI states,
only Delaware has not set targets, and all but New Jersey and Maryland set targets before
joining RGGI. See id.
71. These two states are IL and MN. See id.
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States that are more advanced in developing climate policies are also
likely to have a strong interest in becoming part of a regional initiative.
As they have moved ahead in climate policy, they may feel susceptible
to criticism from constituents that they are shouldering the burdens of
addressing climate change alone, thereby placing the state’s economy at
risk. In-state businesses are likely to worry that they will be subject to
regulatory compliance costs while their competition, located in neighboring
states, will not be. In other words, the state that moves ahead alone may
be viewed as failing to act in its own self-interest, with potentially
negative political ramifications for its leadership. In contrast, if the state
can persuade other states to also move forward with regulation,
particularly those with strong economic linkages, the leading state will
be seen as trying to protect the state economy and state businesses from
disproportionate costs while addressing the problem.
Finally, it is worth noting that the regional climate initiatives are built
upon existing networks of information-sharing and policy-diffusion.
The WCI has roots in a 2003 agreement among the governors of
California, Oregon, and Washington, known as the West Coast Governors’
Global Warming Initiative.72 This initiative grew out of the Western
Governors’ Association, which has a history of bringing governors
together to deal with issues of regional concerns, such as transportation,
water, and energy.73 RGGI grew out of the Ozone Transport Commission
(OTC) created by the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, which convened
representatives from each of the states that ultimately participated in
RGGI to address interstate transport of ozone pollution.74 The OTC, in
turn, established the NOx Budget program, a cap-and-trade program
begun in 1999 to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions from power plants,
that “closely resembles” RGGI.75 The MGGA was signed at the 2007
72. Adam Rose, Thomas D. Peterson & ZhongXiang Zhang, Regional Carbon
Dioxide Permit Trading in the United States: Coalition Choices for Pennsylvania, 14
PENN STATE ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 101-02 (2006), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.
de/13547/1/MPRA_paper_13547.pdf; see also West Coast Governor’s Global Warming
Initiative, PEW CENTER FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/
node/4649 (last visited Aug. 8, 2009).
73. See, e.g., Initiatives and Working Groups, Affiliated and Related Organizations,
WESTERN GOVERNOR’S ASSOCIATION, http://www.westgov.org/wga_working _groups.htm
(last visited Aug. 8, 2009); Mission, Priorities and Strategies, WESTERN GOVERNOR’S
ASSOCIATION, http://www.westgov.org/wga_mission.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
74. Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change 5 (UCLA PUB. L. &
LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Research Paper No. 08-09).
75. Engel & Orbach, supra note 1, at 125.
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Energy Summit of the Midwestern Governors Association.76 As such,
the climate initiatives have often grown out of prior state cooperation
around environmental problems that required regional cooperation such
as transboundary pollution in the Northeast and scarce water resources in
the West.
B. Efficiency and Leakage in Cap-and-Trade
A key factor in explaining the extent of regional collaboration in
climate policy is found in the form of regulation that is most often
contemplated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: cap-and-trade
regulation. The choice to use cap-and-trade regulation pushes decisionmakers towards creating the largest possible regulatory jurisdiction so
that efficiencies can be achieved and leakage can be reduced.
Through regional coordination, participating states can standardize the
emissions markets to facilitate trade throughout the region.77 With a
larger and more diverse emissions market, more opportunities exist for
low-cost emissions reductions. As a result, a regional approach promises
greater economic efficiency for a cap-and-trade program. In general, the
more states that join, the more likely it is that additional low-cost
emissions reductions will be available to reduce the costs of compliance
and enable a more efficient outcome.78 A larger and more diverse market
can also be expected to enhance market viability because it may reduce
volatility induced by unexpected weather and fuel-demand conditions.79
In addition, a regional approach reduces opportunities for emissions
leakage. Emissions leakage “occurs when economic activity is shifted
as a result of the emission control regulation[,] and, as a result, emission
abatement achieved in one location that is subject to emission control
regulation is offset by increased emissions in unregulated locations.”80
In a cap-and-trade program that regulates emitters in one state, emissions
leakage would occur if an emitter chooses to either initially locate or

76. News, Governors Sign Greenhouse Gas Accord, MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE
GAS REDUCTION ACCORD, Nov. 15, 2007, http://www.midwesternaccord.org/news.html.
77. Engel & Orbach, supra note 1, at 125.
78. Id. at 126, 134.
79. PointCarbon.com, Preemptive Strike: The Future of Regional Trading Programs
in the US 11 (Aug. 2, 2008), http://www.pointcarbon.com/research/cmana/cmana/1.954173
(discussing how weather–induced volatility in the emissions market of the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme was dampened by its large geographic and sectoral scope) (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009).
80. OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-B-03002, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A CAP AND TRADE
PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL GLOSSARY-3 (2003).
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relocate outside the state because of the regulatory compliance costs.81
The emissions are still produced, but they are produced outside the
regulatory jurisdiction. Leakage undermines the environmental
effectiveness of a program.
California, for example, has reason to be concerned about leakage and
its unintended environmental consequences if it pursues a cap-and-trade
program alone. First, it would be concerned that out-of-state electricity
would replace or outgrow in-state electricity. Electricity imported into
California is less expensive and more carbon-intensive than Californiaproduced electricity.82 If the cap-and-trade regime increased the cost of
generating electricity in California, then one would expect electricity
imports to grow. Ultimately, the electricity consumed in California
might be associated with even more greenhouse gas emissions than
would have been the case in the absence of the program. Similarly,
industries that are energy-intensive might initially locate or relocate outof-state and then import their products to California.83 Again, those
products consumed by Californians might be associated with higher
greenhouse gas emissions, both because they were made with the input
of more carbon-intensive electricity sources and because they were
transported to California from the out-of-state location.
California’s proposal of a “load-based” emissions cap for electricity
providers addresses the potential leakage of electricity generation that
serves California but not the leakage of industry that makes products for
California.84 A load-based cap limits the emissions associated with all
the electricity consumed in California, whether it is produced in-state or
imported.85 The alternative, common in cap-and-trade programs, is to
simply cap the emissions of polluters located within the regulated

81. Erik B. Bluemel, Regional Regulatory Initiatives Addressing GHG Leakage in
the USA, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING: LESSONS FOR
THEORY AND PRACTICE 226 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters, eds., 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1367929 (follow “download” hyperlink,
then select “SSRN” hyperlink).
82. Id. at 233.
83. Id. (“[E]missions leakage is a potential problem for California, especially for
its energy-intensive industries such as refining”); Engel & Orbach, supra note 1, at 126
(“[A] regional approach . . . reduces economic losses due to the leakage of market share
of fossil fuel intensive products, such as electricity, to industries able to export their
products to the regulating state.”).
84. Bluemel, supra note 81, at 246.
85. Id. at 232.
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jurisdiction.86 Yet while a load-based cap eliminates some concern
about leakage from electricity generation, if a cap pertains only to one
state, an electricity provider that also supplies electricity to neighboring
states may be able simply shift the sale of its higher greenhouse gasemitting electricity to states that have not imposed a load-based cap.87
For these reasons, California has been motivated to seek the
collaboration of other western states through the establishment of the
WCI. In particular, California sought the participation of all eleven states
that comprise the western power grid—the Western Interconnection.88
While four states ultimately declined to participate (Colorado, Idaho,
Nevada, and Wyoming), the regional assemblage addressed many of the
concerns about leakage and the shifting of electricity within the region.
Similarly, in the case of RGGI, “state policy analysts concluded that a
regional approach to cap-and-trade would be more cost-effective given
the strong interstate linkages in regional electricity distribution.”89
While RGGI is more susceptible to leakage because it imposes a cap on
the emissions of electricity generators that are located within the
participating states, rather than a load-based cap on electricity providers,
the program’s regional scope is still useful in reducing leakage
opportunities.90
C. The Regional Race to National Influence
One of the reasons commonly given for why individual states became
so active in climate policy is that, in the absence of federal action and
leadership during the early 2000s, state leaders were able to become
political entrepreneurs and, thereby, gain national recognition for their
leadership.91 In addition to providing political benefits to the leaders
themselves, such leadership could benefit the state more broadly as the
state’s policies might be viewed as a model for future national policy.92
However, it is much more likely that a state leader would gain such
recognition and that a sub-national approach would be viewed as a
model for national policy if that approach had been shown to be capable

86. Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap and Trade Regulation,
34 COL. J. ENVTL L. (forthcoming 2009).
87. Bluemel, supra note 81, at 247.
88. Id. at 246. See Encarta.msn.com, The National Power Grid, http://encarta.
msn.com/media_701509077/the_national_power_grid.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
89. Rabe, supra note 33, at 6-7.
90. Cf. Bluemel, supra note 81, at 240-44 (arguing that RGGI’s primary approach to
reducing leakage is to keep compliance costs low).
91. Engel & Orbach, supra note 1, at 134 (describing the national recognition
accorded to state leaders in climate policy).
92. Engel, supra note 61, at 62.
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of transcending state boundaries. Thus, an additional explanation for the
proliferation of regional initiatives is that states need to cooperate to
engage in a regional race to influence the development of national
policy.93
In the federal vacuum of climate policy that existed, states have likely
viewed working together as their best route toward developing and
projecting a model for climate change regulation that might ultimately
be adopted at the national level. A regional approach would be much
more likely to have such influence because it achieves the buy-in of
governors and constituencies with differing political viewpoints. In the
WCI, for example, four of the member states were headed by a
Democratic governor when they signed on, and three were headed by a
Republican governor.94 As one commentator explained, “There may be
some tipping point at which diffusion reaches sufficient numbers of
states that the federal government concludes that it should respond by
drawing from these state models and establishing some version of this
on a national basis.”95 States are, thus, motivated to partner because a
state cannot build such a model alone.
There are several historical examples of how state leadership can
influence national policy and thereby provide the state with certain
benefits.96 At the time of the passage of a new federal clean air law in
1967, California had already begun developing rigorous standards for
motor vehicle emissions.97 As a result, California became the only state
in the 1967 law to be eligible to receive a waiver of federal preemption
to set its own mobile source emission standards.98 Similarly, in 1989
California adopted a comprehensive Air Quality Management Plan to
bring southern California into compliance with air quality standards, and
this plan influenced the development of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. The new federal provisions relating to alternative fuels,

93. Cf. id. at 64-65 (“Finally, state and local governments can magnify the importance
of their climate change initiatives by banding together with other states and local governments
to form regional coalitions or other interstate groups that address climate together”).
94. The Republican governors were Gov. Schwarzenegger (CA); Gov. Richardson
(NM); and Gov. Huntsman (UT).
95. Rabe, supra note 33, at 5.
96. Cf. Engel, supra note 61, at 62 (recognizing that states have had “prior success
with influencing national environmental policy”).
97. Jan Stevens, Air Pollution and the Federal System: Responses to Felt Necessities,
22 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 674-75 (1970-1971).
98. Id. at 675-76.
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emission-control standards, and ride-sharing were all significantly
affected by the California plan, and they bolstered and facilitated the
implementation of the California plan.99 In these situations, the state of
California effectively “set the table” for federal policy and thereby
benefited. When states join together as they have in the climate initiatives,
the possibilities to influence national policy are even greater.
In the case of climate change regulation, if a national cap-and-trade
policy is modeled after a sub-national cap-and-trade model of regulation,
the benefits to the sub-national jurisdiction are likely to be even more
direct. Actors in the “first-mover” sub-national jurisdiction might have
access to tradable permits that would be marketable in the new national
permit market.100 For example, the climate bill proposed by Congressmen
Waxman and Markey would enable allowances issued by “the State of
California or for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or the Western
Climate Initiative” to be exchanged for federal allowances.101 More
generally, such actors would gain experience in an emissions trading
program and be well positioned to take advantage of economic
opportunities presented by the expansion of such a program to the
national level.102
The possibility also exists that states may band together to try to hold
back or restrain the development and adoption of rigorous national
policy. Regional arrangements could be the “result of efforts to restrain
states that are being too aggressive.”103 The Midwestern Greenhouse
Gas Accord is particularly susceptible to the charge that such a negative
motivation may be at play in the case of some of its member states, or
even in the regional agreement as a whole. As the most coal-dependent
region of the country, one would expect that this set of states would want
to restrain rather than further the adoption of rigorous greenhouse gas
reduction policies at the national level. They might view their regional
collaboration as being able to offer an alternative, more moderate model
for national policy. This proposition is supported by their homepage
introduction to the agreement: “Realizing the unique and major impact
that the Midwestern states play in the emissions of carbon, these
governors wanted to institute Midwestern practicality in the debate on
99. Sheldon Kamieniecki and Michael R. Ferrall, Intergovernmental Relations and
Clean-Air Policy in Southern California, 21 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 143,
150-52.
100. Engel & Orbach, supra note 1, at 134-35. It is also possible, however, that early
actors may not gain much in a future national regime, either because a cap and trade approach
is not used, or because the regime gives little value to credits from subnational programs.
101. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009).
102. Id.
103. Engel, supra note 61, at 59.
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global warming.”104 Also, as mentioned above, only two of the MGGA
states have set statewide emissions reductions targets.
IV. CONCLUSION
The state collaboration that has produced three major regional climate
change initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions presents a puzzle
for environmental law. State cooperation is somewhat common where
there is a shared regional resource that requires joint management, and
the costs of collaboration are offset by the benefits that states derive
from such joint management. However, for problems such as reducing
greenhouse gases, where the benefits cannot be captured by the
cooperating jurisdictions, theorists have consistently predicted state
competition.
This Article discusses three possible explanations for the collaborative
reality of state climate change regulation. First, states have economic
and political reasons to diffuse their policy innovations and otherwise
share and receive information. States on the receiving end perceive that
such information offers economic development opportunities. States
that share information and recruit partners to their approach gain
political cover against accusations that their leadership is economically
detrimental to the state. Second, states have been most interested in
using a cap-and-trade approach, which can achieve greater efficiency
through implementation over a large geographic area. The larger area
enables inclusion of low-cost sources of emissions reductions, minimizes
the problem of leakage, and may otherwise enhance market viability.
Third, states have discovered that they must cooperate to offer a model
that will be viable on a national scale. If they succeed in offering such a
model, then the advantages that they accrue as first-movers may be
significant.
The extent of collaboration that has occurred in the absence of federal
policy bodes well for state action in the context of a future federal
climate change regime. Given the extremely significant challenge that
climate change presents, federal policies will not be sufficient. Rather,
localities, states, and regions will need to continue to creatively engage
with the problems that arise in both reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and undertaking the kinds of activities that will be necessary for their
104. Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord Home Page, http://www.midwestern
accord.org (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
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populations to adapt to climate change. Through the regional initiatives,
the seeds of state engagement and cooperation in climate policy have
been sown.
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